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Abstract
Extensive-form games are a common model for multiagent
interactions with imperfect information. In two-player zero-
sum games, the typical solution concept is a Nash equilibrium
over the unconstrained strategy set for each player. In many
situations, however, we would like to constrain the set of pos-
sible strategies. For example, constraints are a natural way to
model limited resources, risk mitigation, safety, consistency
with past observations of behavior, or other secondary objec-
tives for an agent. In small games, optimal strategies under
linear constraints can be found by solving a linear program;
however, state-of-the-art algorithms for solving large games
cannot handle general constraints. In this work we introduce
a generalized form of Counterfactual Regret Minimization
that provably finds optimal strategies under any feasible set of
convex constraints. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our
algorithm for finding strategies that mitigate risk in security
games, and for opponent modeling in poker games when given
only partial observations of private information.
1 Introduction
Multiagent interactions are often modeled using extensive-
form games (EFGs), a powerful framework that incoporates
sequential actions, hidden information, and stochastic events.
Recent research has focused on computing approximately
optimal strategies in large extensive-form games, resulting in
a solution to heads-up limit Texas Hold’em, a game with ap-
proximately 1017 states (Bowling et al. 2015), and in two in-
dependent super-human computer agents for the much larger
heads-up no-limit Texas Hold’em (Moravcˇík et al. 2017;
Brown and Sandholm 2018).
When modeling an interaction with an EFG, for each out-
come we must specify the agents’ utility, a cardinal measure
of the outcome’s desirability. Utility is particularly difficult to
specify. Take, for example, situations where an agent has mul-
tiple objectives to balance: a defender in a security game with
the primary objective of protecting a target and a secondary
objective of minimizing expected cost, or a robot operating
in a dangerous environment with a primary task to complete
and a secondary objective of minimizing damage to itself and
others. How these objectives combine into a single value, the
agent’s utility, is ill-specified and error prone.
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One approach for handling multiple objectives is to use a
linear combination of per-objective utilities. This approach
has been used in EFGs to “tilt” poker agents toward taking
specific actions (Johanson et al. 2011), and to mix between
cost minimization and risk mitigation in sequential security
games (Lisý, Davis, and Bowling 2016). However, objec-
tives are typically measured on incommensurable scales. This
leads to dubious combinations of weights often selected by
trial-and-error.
A second approach is to constrain the agents’ strategy
spaces directly. For example, rather than minimizing the
expected cost, we use a hard constraint that disqualifies high-
cost strategies. Using such constraints has been extensively
studied in single-agent perfect information settings (Altman
1999) and partial information settings (Isom, Meyn, and
Braatz 2008; Poupart et al. 2015; Santana, Thiébaux, and
Williams 2016), as well as in (non-sequential) security games
(Brown et al. 2014).
Incorporating strategy constraints when solving EFGs
presents a unique challenge. Nash equilibria can be found by
solving a linear program (LP) derived using the sequence-
form representation (Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel 1996).
This LP is easily modified to incorporate linear strategy con-
straints; however, LPs do not scale to large games. Special-
ized algorithms for efficiently solving large games, such as
an instantiation of Nesterov’s excessive gap technique (EGT)
(Hoda et al. 2010) as well as counterfactual regret minimiza-
tion (CFR) (Zinkevich et al. 2008) and its variants (Lanctot
et al. 2009; Tammelin et al. 2015), cannot integrate arbitrary
strategy constraints directly. Currently, the only large-scale
approach is restricted to constraints that consider only indi-
vidual decisions (Farina, Kroer, and Sandholm 2017).
In this work we present the first scalable algorithm for
solving EFGs with arbitrary convex strategy constraints. Our
algorithm, Constrained CFR, provably converges towards
a strategy profile that is minimax optimal under the given
constraints. It does this while retaining the O(1/√T ) con-
vergence rate of CFR and requiring additional memory pro-
portional to the number of constraints. We demonstrate the
empirical effectiveness of Constrained CFR by comparing
its solution to that of an LP solver in a security game. We
also present a novel constraint-based technique for opponent
modeling with partial observations in a small poker game.
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2 Background
Formally, an extensive-form game (Osborne and Rubinstein
1994) is a game tree defined by:
• A set of players N . This work focuses on games with two
players, so N = {1, 2}.
• A set of histories H , the tree’s nodes rooted at ∅. The leafs,
Z ⊆ H , are terminal histories. For any history h ∈ H , we
let h′ @ h denote a prefix h′ of h, and necessarily h′ ∈ H .
• For each h ∈ H \ Z, a set of actions A(h). For any a ∈
A(h), ha ∈ H is a child of h.
• A player function P : H\Z → N∪{c} defining the player
to act at h. If P (h) = c then chance acts according to a
known probability distribution σc(h) ∈ ∆|A(h)|, where
∆|A(h)| is the probability simplex of dimension |A(h)|.
• A set of utility functions ui : Z → R, for each player. Out-
come z has utility ui(z) for player i. We assume the game
is zero-sum, i.e., u1(z) = −u2(z). Let u(z) = u1(z).
• For each player i ∈ N , a collection of information sets Ii.
Ii partitions Hi, the histories where i acts. Two histories
h, h′ in an information set I ∈ Ii are indistinguishable to
i. Necessarily A(h) = A(h′), which we denote by A(I).
When a player acts they do not observe the history, only
the information set it belongs to, which we denote as I[h].
We assume a further requirement on the information sets Ii
called perfect recall. It requires that players are never forced
to forget information they once observed. Mathematically
this means that all indistinguishable histories share the same
sequence of past information sets and actions for the actor.
Although this may seem like a restrictive assumption, some
perfect recall-like condition is needed to guarantee that an
EFG can be solved in polynommial time, and all sequential
games played by humans exhibit perfect recall.
2.1 Strategies
A behavioral strategy for player i maps each information
set I ∈ Ii to a distribution over actions, σi(I) ∈ ∆|A(I)|.
The probability assigned to a ∈ A(I) is σi(I, a). A strategy
profile, σ = {σ1, σ2}, specifies a strategy for each player.
We label the strategy of the opponent of player i as σ−i. The
sets of behavioral strategies and strategy profiles are Σi and
Σ respectively.
A strategy profile uniquely defines a reach probability for
any history h ∈ H:
piσ(h) :=
∏
h′avh
σP (h′)(I[h
′], a) (1)
This product decomposes into contributions from each player
and chance, piσ11 (h)pi
σ2
2 (h)pic(h). For a player i ∈ N , we
denote the contributions from the opponent and chance as
pi
σ−i
−i (h) so that pi
σ(h) = piσii (h)pi
σ−i
−i (h). By perfect recall
we have piσii (h) = pi
σi
i (h
′) for any h, h′ in same information
set I ∈ Ii. We thus also write this probability as piσii (I).
Given a strategy profile σ = {σ1, σ2}, the expected utility
for player i is given by
ui(σ) = ui(σ1, σ2) :=
∑
z∈Z
piσ(z)ui(z). (2)
A strategy σi is an ε-best response to the opponent’s strat-
egy σ−i if ui(σi, σ−i) + ε ≥ ui(σ′i, σ−i) for any alternative
strategy σ′i ∈ Σi. A strategy profile is an ε-Nash equilibrium
when each σi is a ε-best response to its opponent; such a
profile exists for any ε ≥ 0. The exploitability of a strategy
profile is the smallest ε = 1/2(ε1 +ε2) such that each σi is an
εi-best response. Due to the zero-sum property, the game’s
Nash equilibria are the saddle-points of the minimax problem
max
σ1∈Σ1
min
σ2∈Σ2
u(σ1, σ2) = min
σ2∈Σ2
max
σ1∈Σ1
u(σ1, σ2). (3)
A zero-sum EFG can be represented in sequence form
(von Stengel 1996). The sets of sequence-form strategies for
players 1 and 2 are X and Y respectively. A sequence-form
strategy x ∈ X is a vector indexed by pairs I ∈ I1, a ∈ A(I).
The entry x(I,a) is the probability of player 1 playing the
sequence of actions that reaches I and then playing action a.
A special entry, x∅ = 1, represents the empty sequence. Any
behavioral strategy σ1 ∈ Σ1 has a corresponding sequence-
form strategy SEQ(σ1) where
SEQ(σ1)(I,a) := pi
σ1
1 (I)σ1(I, a). ∀I ∈ Ii, a ∈ A(I)
Player i has a unique sequence to reach any history h ∈ H
and, by perfect recall, any information set I ∈ Ii. Let
xh and xI denote the corresponding entries in x. Thus,
we are free to write the expected utility as u(x,y) =∑
z∈Z pic(z)xzyzu(z). This is bilinear, i.e., there exists a
payoff matrix A such that u(x,y) = xᵀAy. A consequence
of perfect recall and the laws of probability is for I ∈ I1
that xI =
∑
a∈A(I) x(I,a) and that x ≥ 0. These constraints
are linear and completely describe the polytope of sequence-
form strategies. Using these together, (3) can be expressed as
a bilinear saddle point problem over the polytopes X and Y:
max
x∈X
min
y∈Y
xᵀAy = min
y∈Y
max
x∈X
xᵀAy (4)
For a convex function f : X → R, let ∇f(x) be any
element of the subdifferential ∂f(x), and let ∇(I,a)f(x) be
the (I, a) element of this subgradient.
2.2 Counterfactual regret minimization
Counterfactual regret minimization (Zinkevich et al. 2008) is
a large-scale equilibrium-finding algorithm that, in self-play,
iteratively updates a strategy profile in a fashion that drives
its counterfactual regret to zero. This regret is defined in
terms of counterfactual values. The counterfactual value of
reaching information set I is the expected payoff under the
counterfactual that the acting player attempts to reach it:
v(I, σ) =
∑
h∈I
pi
σ−i
−i (h)
∑
z∈Z
piσ(h, z)u(z) (5)
Here i = P (h) for any h ∈ I , and piσ(h, z) is the probability
of reaching z from h under σ. Let σI→a be the profile that
plays a at I and otherwise plays according to σ. For a series
of profiles σ1, .., σT , the average counterfactual regret of
action a at I is RT (I, a) = 1T
∑T
t=1 v(I, σ
t
I→a)− v(I, σt).
To minimize counterfactual regret, CFR employs regret
matching (Hart and Mas-Colell 2000). In particular, actions
are chosen in proportion to positive regret, σt+1(I, a) ∝
(Rt(I, a))+ where (x)+ = max(x, 0). It follows that
the average strategy profile σT , defined by σTi (I, a) ∝∑T
t=1 pi
σt
i (I)σ
t
i(I, a), is an O(1/
√
T )-Nash equilibrium
(Zinkevich et al. 2008). In sequence form, the average is
given by xT = 1T
∑T
t=1 x
t.
3 Solving games with strategy constraints
We begin by formally introducing the constrained optimiza-
tion problem for extensive-form games. We specify convex
constraints on the set of sequence-form strategies1 X with
a set of k convex functions fi : X → R where we require
fi(x) ≤ 0 for each i = 1, ..., k. We use constraints on the
sequence form instead of on the behavioral strategies be-
cause reach probabilities and utilities are linear functions of
a sequence-form strategy, but not of a behavioral strategy.
The optimization problem can be stated as:
max
x∈X
min
y∈Y
xᵀAy (6)
subject to fi(x) ≤ 0 for i = 1, ..., k
The first step toward solving this problem is to incorporate
the constraints into the objective with Lagrange multipliers.
If the problem is feasible (i.e., there exists a feasible xf ∈ X
such that fi(xf ) ≤ 0 for each i), then (6) is equivalent to:
max
x∈X
min
y∈Y
λ≥0
xᵀAy −
k∑
i=1
λifi(x) (7)
We will now present intuition as to how CFR can be modi-
fied to solve (7), before presenting the algorithm and proving
its convergence.
3.1 Intuition
CFR can be seen as doing a saddle point optimization on
the objective in (3), using the gradients2 of g(x,y) = xᵀAy
given as
∇xg(xt,yt) = Ayt ∇y−g(xt,yt) = −(xt)ᵀA.
(8)
The intuition behind our modified algorithm is to perform
the same updates, but with gradients of the modified utility
function
h(x,y,λ) = xᵀAy −
k∑
i=1
λifi(x). (9)
The (sub)gradients we use in the modified CFR update are
then
∇xh(xt,yt,λt) = Ayt −
k∑
i=1
λti∇fi(xt)
∇y−h(xt,yt,λt) = −(xt)ᵀA.
(10)
1Without loss of generality, we assume throughout this paper
that the constrained player is player 1, i.e. the maximizing player.
2For a more complete discussion of the connection between CFR
and gradient ascent, see (Waugh and Bagnell 2015).
Note that this leaves the update of the unconstrained player
unchanged. In addition, we must update λt using the gra-
dients ∇λ−h(xt,yt,λt) =
∑k
i=1 fi(x
t)ei, which is the
k-vector with fi(xt) at index i. This can be done with any
gradient method, e.g. simple gradient ascent with the update
rule
λt+1i = max(λ
t
i + α
tfi(x
t), 0) (11)
for some step size αt ∝ 1/√t.
3.2 Constrained counterfactual regret
minimization
We give the Constrained CFR (CCFR) procedure in Algo-
rithm 1. The constrained player’s strategy is updated with
the function CCFR and the unconstrained player’s strategy
is updated with unmodified CFR. In this instantiation λt is
updated with gradient ascent, though any regret minimizing
update can be used. We clamp each λti to the interval [0, β]
for reasons discussed in the following section. Together, these
updates form a full iteration of CCFR.
Algorithm 1 Constrained CFR
1: function CCFR(σti ,σt−i,λ
t)
2: for I ∈ Ii do . in reverse topological order
3: for a ∈ A(I) do
4: vt(I, a)←∑z∈Z1[Ia] piσt−i−i (z)u(z)
+
∑
I′∈succ(I,a) v˜
t(I ′)
5: v˜t(I, a)← vt(I, a)
−∑ki=1 λti∇(I,a)fi(SEQ(σti))
6: end for
7: v˜t(I)←∑a∈A(I) σti(I, a)v˜t(I, a)
8: for a ∈ A(I) do
9: r˜t(I, a)← v˜t(I, a)− v˜t(I)
10: R˜t(I, a)← R˜t−1(I, a) + r˜t(I, a)
11: end for
12: for a ∈ A(I) do
13: σt+1i (I, a)← (R˜
t(I,a))+∑
b∈A(I)(R˜t(I,b))+
14: end for
15: end for
16: return σt+1i
17: end function
18: for t = 1, ..., T do
19: σt2 ← CFR(σt−11 , σt−12 )
20: for i = 1, ..., k do
21: λti ← λt−1i + αtfi(Ψ(σt−11 ))
22: λti ← CLAMP(λti, [0,B])
23: end for
24: σt1 ← CCFR(σt−11 , σt2, ~λt)
25: σt2 ← t−1t σt−12 + 1tσt2
26: σt1 ← t−1t σt−11 + 1tσt1
27: end for
The CCFR update for the constrained player is the same as
the CFR update, with the crucial difference of line 5, which
incorporates the second part of the gradient ∇xh into the
counterfactual value vt(I, a). The loop beginning on line 2
goes through the constrained player’s information sets, walk-
ing the tree bottom-up from the leafs. The counterfactual
value vt(I, a) is set on line 4 using the values of terminal
states Z1[Ia] which directly follow from action a at I (this
corresponds to the Ayt term of the gradient), as well as
the already computed values of successor information sets
succ(I, a). Line 7 computes the value of the current infor-
mation set using the current strategy. Lines 9 and 10 update
the stored regrets for each action. Line 13 updates the current
strategy with regret matching.
3.3 Theoretical analysis
In order to ensure that the utilities passed to the regret match-
ing update are bounded, we will require λt to be bounded
from above; in particular, we will choose λt ∈ [0, β]k. We
can then evaluate the chosen sequence λ1, ...,λT using its
regret in comparison to the optimal λ∗ ∈ [0, β]k:
RTλ (β) := max
λ∗∈[0,β]k
1
T
T∑
t=1
k∑
i=1
[
λ∗i fi(SEQ(σ
t
1))
− λtifi(SEQ(σt1))
]
.
(12)
We can guarantee RTλ (β) = O(1/
√
T ), e.g. by choosing λt
with projected gradient ascent (Zinkevich 2003).
We now present the theorems which show that CCFR
can be used to approximately solve (6). In the following
thereoms we assume that T ∈ N, we have some convex,
continuous constraint functions f1, ..., fk, and we use some
regret-minimizing method to select the vectors λ1, ...,λT
each in [0, β]k for some β ≥ 0.
First, we show that the exploitability of the average strate-
gies approaches the optimal value:
Theorem 1. If CCFR is used to select the sequence of strate-
gies σ11 , ..., σ
T
1 and CFR is used to select the sequence of
strategies σ12 , ..., σ
T
2 , then the following holds:
max
σ∗1∈Σ1
s.t. fi(σ∗1 )≤0 ∀i
u(σ∗1 , σ
T
2 )− min
σ∗2∈Σ2
u(σT1 , σ
∗
2)
≤ 4 (∆u + kβF )M
√|A|√
T
+ 2RTλ (β) (13)
where ∆u = maxz u(z) − minz u(z) is the range of pos-
sible utilities, |A| is the maximum number of actions at
any information set, k is the number of constraints, F =
maxx,i ||∇fi(x)||1 is a bound on the subgradients3, and M
is a game-specific constant.
All proofs are given in the appendix. Theorem 1 guarantees
that the constrained exploitability of the final CCFR strategy
profile converges to the minimum exploitability possible over
the set of feasible profiles, at a rate of O(1/√T ) (assuming
a suitable regret minimizer is used to select λt).
In order to establish that CCFR approximately solves op-
timization (6), we must also show that the CCFR strategies
converge to being feasible. In the case of arbitrary β ≥ 0:
3Such a bound must exist as the strategy sets are compact and
the constraint functions are continuous.
Theorem 2. If CCFR is used to select the sequence of strate-
gies σ11 , ..., σ
T
1 and CFR is used to select the sequence of
strategies σ12 , ..., σ
T
2 , then the following holds:
fi(SEQ(σT1 )) ≤
RTλ (β)
β
+
(∆u + 2kβF )M
√|A|
β
√
T
+
∆u
β
∀i ∈ {1, ..., k} (14)
This theorem guarantees that the CCFR strategy converges
to the feasible set at a rate of O(1/√T ), up to an approxima-
tion error of ∆u/β induced by the bounding of λt.
We can eliminate the approximation error when β is chosen
large enough for some optimal λ∗ to lie within the bounded
set [0, β]k. In order to establish the existence of such a λ∗,
we must assume a constraint qualification such as Slater’s
condition, which requires the existance of a feasible x which
strictly satisfies any nonlinear constraints (fi(x) ≤ 0 for all i
and fj(x) < 0 for all nonlinear fj). Then there exists a finite
λ∗ which is a solution to optimization (7), which we can use
to give the bound:
Theorem 3. Assume that f1, ..., fk satisfy a constraint qual-
ification such as Slater’s condition, and define λ∗ to a finite
solution for λ in the resulting optimization (7). Then if β is
chosen such that β > λ∗i for all i, and CCFR and CFR are
used to respectively select the strategy sequences σ11 , ..., σ
T
1
and σ12 , ..., σ
T
2 , the following holds:
fi(SEQ(σT1 )) ≤
RTλ (β)
β − λ∗i
+
2 (∆u + kβF )M
√|A|
(β − λ∗i )
√
T
∀i ∈ {1, ..., k} (15)
In this case, the CCFR strategy converges fully to the
feasible set, at a rate of O(1/√T ), given a suitable choice of
regret minimizer for λt. We provide an explicit example of
such a minimizer in the following corollary:
Corollary 3.1. If the conditions of Theorem 3 hold and, in
addition, the sequence λ1, ...,λT is chosen using projected
gradient descent with constant learning rate αt = β/(G
√
T )
where G = maxi,x fi(x), then the following hold:
fi(SEQ(σT1 )) ≤
βG+ 2 (∆u + kβF )M
√|A|
(β − λ∗i )
√
T
∀i ∈ {1, ..., k} (16)
max
σ∗1∈Σ1
s.t. fi(σ∗1 )≤0 ∀i
u(σ∗1 , σ
T
2 )− min
σ∗2∈Σ2
u(σT1 , σ
∗
2)
≤ 4 (∆u + kβF )M
√|A|+ 2βG√
T
(17)
Proof. This follows from using the projected gradient de-
scent regret bound (Zinkevich 2003) to give
RTλ (β) ≤ β
2
2αT
+ G
2
2
∑T
t=1 α
t ≤ βG√
T
.
Finally, we discuss how to choose β. When there is a mini-
mum acceptable constrant violation, β can be selected with
Theorem 2 to guarantee that the violation is no more than
the specified value, either asymptotically or after a specified
number of iterations T . When no amount of constraint viola-
tion is acceptable, β should be chosen such that β ≥ λ∗i by
Theorem 3. If λ∗ is unknown, CCFR can be run with an arbi-
trary β for a number of iterations. If the average 1T
∑T
t=1 λ
t
i
is close to β, then β ≤ λ∗i , so β is doubled and CCFR run
again. Otherwise, it is guaranteed that β > λ∗i and CCFR
will converge to a solution with no constraint violation.
4 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, no previous work has pro-
posed a technique for solving either of the optimizations
(6) or (7) for general constraints in extensive-form games.
Optimization (7) belongs to a general class of saddle point op-
timizations for which a number of accelerated methods with
O(1/T ) convergence have been proposed (Nemirovski 2004;
Nesterov 2005b; Nesterov 2005a; Juditsky, Nemirovski, and
Tauvel 2011; Chambolle and Pock 2011). These methods
have been applied to unconstrained equilibrium computa-
tion in extensive-form games using a family of prox func-
tions initially proposed by Hoda et. al. (Hoda et al. 2010;
Kroer et al. 2015; Kroer et al. 2017). Like CFR, these algo-
rithms could be extended to solve the optimization (7).
Despite a worse theoretical dependence on T , CFR is pre-
ferred to accelerated methods as our base algorithm for a
number of practical reasons.
• CFR can be easily modified with a number of different
sampling schemes, adapting to sparsity and achieving
greatly improved convergence over the deterministic ver-
sion (Lanctot et al. 2009). Although the stochastic mirror
prox algorithm has been used to combine an accelerated
update with sampling in extensive-form games, each of
its iterations still requires walking each player’s full strat-
egy space to compute the prox functions, and it has poor
performance in practice (Kroer et al. 2015).
• CFR has good empirical performance in imperfect recall
games (Waugh et al. 2009b) and even provably converges
to an equilibrium in certain subclasses of well-formed
games (Lanctot et al. 2012; Lisý, Davis, and Bowling
2016), which we will make use of in Section 5.1. The prox
function used by the accelerated methods is ill-defined in
all imperfect recall games.
• CFR theoretically scales better with game size than do
the accelerated techniques. The constant M in the bounds
of Theorems 1-3 is at worst |I|, and for many games of
interest is closer to |I|1/2 (Burch 2017, Section 3.2). The
best convergence bound for an accelerated method depends
in the worst case on |I|22d where d is the depth of the
game tree, and is at best |I|2d (Kroer et al. 2017).
• The CFR update can be modified to CFR+ to give a guaran-
teed bound on tracking regret and greatly improve empiri-
cal performance (Tammelin et al. 2015). CFR+ has been
shown to converge with initial rate faster than O(1/T ) in
a variety of games (Burch 2017, Sections 4.3-4.4).
s0e
s0p
2w
w
Figure 1: Transit Game
• Finally, CFR is not inherently limited to O(1/√T ) worst-
case convergence. Regret minimization algorithms can be
optimistically modified to give O(1/T ) convergence in
self-play (Rakhlin and Sridharan 2013). Such a modifica-
tion has been applied to CFR (Burch 2017, Section 4.4).
We describe CCFR as an extension of deterministic CFR
for ease of exposition. All of the CFR modifications described
in this section can be applied to CCFR out-of-the-box.
5 Experimental evaluation
We present two domains for experimental evaluation in this
paper. In the first, we use constraints to model a secondary ob-
jective when generating strategies in a model security game.
In the second domain, we use constraints for opponent mod-
eling in a small poker game. We demonstrate that using con-
straints for modeling data allows us to learn counter-strategies
that approach optimal counter-strategies as the amount of data
increases. Unlike previous opponent modeling techniques for
poker, we do not require our data to contain full observations
of the opponent’s private cards for this guarantee to hold.
5.1 Transit game
The transit game is a model security game introduced in
(Bosansky et al. 2015). With size parameter w, the game is
played on an 8-connected grid of size 2w × w (see Figure 1)
over d = 2w + 4 time steps. One player, the evader, wishes
to cross the grid from left to right while avoiding the other
player, the patroller. Actions are movements along the edges
of the grid, but each move has a probability 0.1 of failing. The
evader receives −1 utils for each time he encounters the pa-
troller, 1 utils when he escapes on reaching the east end of the
grid, and −0.02 utils for each time step that passes without
escaping. The patroller receives the negative of the evader’s
utils, making the game zero-sum. The players observe only
their own actions and locations.
The patroller has a secondary objective of minimizing the
risk that it fails to return to its base (s0p in Figure 1) by the end
of the game. In the original formulation, this was modeled
using a large utility penalty when the patroller doesn’t end the
game at its base. For the reasons discussed in the introduction,
it is more natural to model this objective as a linear constraint
on the patroller’s strategy, bounding the maximum probability
that it doesn’t return to base.
For our experiments, we implemented CCFR on top of
the NFGSS-CFR algorithm described in (Lisý, Davis, and
Bowling 2016). In the NFGSS framework, each information
set is defined by only the current grid state and the time step;
history is not remembered. This is a case of imperfect recall,
but our theory still holds as the game is well-formed. The
constraint on the patroller is defined as∑
sd,a
piσp(sd)σ(sd, a)
∑
sd+1 6=s0p
T (sd, a, sd+1) ≤ br
where sd, a are state action pairs at time step d, T (sd, a, sd+1)
is the probability that sd+1 is the next state given that action
a is taken from sd, and br is the chosen risk bound. This
is a well-defined linear constraint despite imperfect recall,
as piσp(sd) is a linear combination over the sequences that
reach sd. We update the CCFR constraint weights λ using
stochastic gradient ascent with constant step size αt = 1,
which we found to work well across a variety of game sizes
and risk bounds. In practice, we found that bounding λ was
unnecessary for convergence.
Previous work has shown that double oracle (DO) tech-
niques outperform solving the full game linear program (LP)
in the unconstrained transit game (Bosansky et al. 2015;
Lisý, Davis, and Bowling 2016). However, an efficient best
response oracle exists in the unconstrained setting only be-
cause a best response is guaranteed to exist in the space of
pure strategies, which can be efficiently searched. Conversely,
constrained best responses might exist only in the space of
mixed strategies, meaning that the best response computa-
tion requires solving an LP of comparable size to the LP for
the full game Nash equilibrium. This makes DO methods
inappropriate for the general constrained setting, so we omit
comparison to DO methods in this work.
Results We first empirically demonstrate that CCFR con-
verges to optimality by comparing its produced strategies
with strategies produced by solving the LP representation
of the game with the simplex solver in IBM ILOG CPLEX
12.7.1. Figure 2a shows the risk and exploitability for strate-
gies produced by running CCFR for 100,000 iterations on
a game of size w = 8, with a variety of values for the risk
bound br. In each case, the computed strategy had risk within
0.001 of the specified bound br, and exploitability within
0.001 of the corresponding LP strategy (not shown because
the points are indistinguishable). The convergence over time
for one particular case, br = 0.1, is shown in Figure 2b,
where the plotted value is the difference in exploitability be-
tween the average CCFR strategy and the LP strategy, shown
with a log-linear scale. The vertical line shows the time used
to compute the LP strategy.
Convergence times for the CPLEX LP and CCFR with
risk bound br = 0.1 are shown on a log scale for a variety of
game sizes w in Figure 2c. The time for CCFR is presented
for a variety of precisions , which bounds both the optimality
of the final exploitability and the violation of the risk bound.
The points for game size w = 8 are also shown in Figure 2b.
The LP time is calculated with default precision  = 10−6.
Changing the precision to a higher value actually results in
a slower computation, due to the precision also controlling
the size of allowed infeasibility in the Harris ratio test (Klotz
and Newman 2013).
Even at w = 6, a game which has relatively small strategy
sizes of ∼6,000 values, CCFR can give a significant speedup
for a small tradeoff in precision. At w = 8 and larger, the LP
is clearly slower than CCFR even for the relatively modest
precision of  = 0.001. For game size w = 10, with strategy
sizes of ∼25,000 values, the LP is more than an order of
magnitude slower than high precision CCFR.
5.2 Opponent modeling in poker
In multi-agent settings, strategy constraints can serve an addi-
tional purpose beyond encoding secondary objectives. Often,
when creating a strategy for one agent, we have partial infor-
mation on how the other agent(s) behave. A way to make use
of this information is to solve the game with constraints on
the other agents’ strategies, enforcing that their strategy in
the solution is consistent with their observed behavior. As a
motivating example, we consider poker games in which we
always observe our opponent’s actions, but not necessarily
the private card(s) that they hold when making the action.
In poker games, if either player takes the fold action,
the other player automatically wins the game. Because the
players’ private cards are irrelevant to the game outcome
in this case, they are typically not revealed. We thus con-
sider the problem of opponent modeling from observing past
games, in which the opponent’s hand of private card(s) is
only revealed when a showdown is reached and the player
with the better hand wins. Most previous work in oppo-
nent modeling has either assumed full observation of private
cards after a fold (Johanson, Zinkevich, and Bowling 2008;
Johanson and Bowling 2009) or has ignored observations of
opponent actions entirely, instead only using observed utili-
ties (Bard et al. 2013). The only previous work which uses
these partial observations has no theoretical guarantees on
solution quality (Ganzfried and Sandholm 2011).
We first collect data by playing against the opponent with a
probe strategy, which is a uniformly random distribution over
the non-fold actions. To model the opponent in an unbiased
way, we generate two types of sequence-form constraints
from this data. First, for each possible sequence of public
actions and for each of our own private hands, we build an
unbiased confidence interval on the probability that we are
dealt the hand and the public sequence occurs. This probabil-
ity is a weighted sum of opponent sequence probabilities over
their possible private cards, and thus the confidence bounds
become linear sequence-form constraints. Second, for each
terminal history that is a showdown, we build a confidence
interval on the probability that the showdown is reached. In
combination, these two sets of constraints guarantee that the
CCFR strategy converges to a best response to the oppo-
nent strategy as the number of observed games increases. A
proof of convergence to a best response and full details of the
constraints are provided in the appendix.
Infeasible constraints Because we construct each con-
straint separately, there is no guarantee that the full constraint
set is simultaneously feasible. In fact, in our experiments the
constraints were typically mildly infeasible. However, this
is not a problem for CCFR, which doesn’t require feasible
constraints to have well-defined updates. In fact, because
we bound the Lagrange multipliers, CCFR still theoretically
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Figure 2: Risk and exploitability of final CCFR strategies with game size w = 8 (a), convergence of CCFR exploitability to LP exploitability
with w = 8 and risk bound br = 0.1 (b), and dependence of convergence time on game size for LP and CCFR methods (c). All algorithms are
deterministic, so times are exact.
converges to a sensible solution, especially when the total
infeasibility is small. For more details on how CCFR handles
infeasibility, see the appendix.
Results We ran our experiments in Leduc Hold’em
(Southey et al. 2005), a small poker game played with a
six card deck over two betting rounds. To generate a target
strategy profile to model, we solved the "JQ.K/pair.nopair"
abstracted version of the game (Waugh et al. 2009a). We then
played a probe strategy profile against the target profile to
generate constraints as described above, and ran CCFR twice
to find each half of a counter-profile that is optimal against
the set of constrained profiles. We used gradient ascent with
step size αt = 1000/
√
t to update the λ values, and ran
CCFR for 106 iterations, which we found to be sufficient for
approximate convegence with ε < 0.001.
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Figure 3: Performance of counter-profiles trained with CCFR against
a target profile in Leduc Hold’em. Results are averaged over 10 runs,
with minimum and maximum values shown as error bars. Values
achieved by a Nash equilibrium profile and a best response profile
are shown as horizontal lines for reference.
We evaluate how well the trained counter-profile performs
when played against the target profile, and in particular in-
vestigate how this performance depends on the number of
games we observe to produce the counter-profile, and on
the confidence γ used for the confidence interval constraints.
Results are shown in Figure 3, with a log-linear scale. With
a high confidence γ = 99% (looser constraints), we obtain
an expected value that is better than the equilibrium expected
value with fewer than 100 observed games on average, and
with fewer than 200 observed games consistently. Lower con-
fidence levels (tighter constraints) resulted in more variable
performance and poor average value with small numbers
of observed games, but also faster learning as the number
of observed games increased. For all confidence levels, the
expected value converges to the best response value as the
number of observed games increases.
6 Conclusion
Strategy constraints are a powerful modeling tool in
extensive-form games. Prior to this work, solving games
with strategy constraints required solving a linear program,
which scaled poorly to many of the very large games of
practical interest. We introduced CCFR, the first efficient
large-scale algorithm for solving extensive-form games with
general strategy constraints. We demonstrated that CCFR is
effective at solving sequential security games with bounds
on acceptable risk. We also introduced a method of gener-
ating strategy constraints from partial observations of poker
games, resulting in the first opponent modeling technique
that has theoretical guarantees with partial observations. We
demonstrated the effectiveness of this technique for opponent
modeling in Leduc Hold’em.
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A Notation
Define Ψ(σi) = SEQ(σi) for brevity. Let u˜ be the modified utility function:
u˜(σ1, σ2, λ) = u(σ1, σ2)−
k∑
i=1
λifi(Ψ(σ1)) (18)
For any history h ∈ H , define
Z[h] = {z ∈ Z | h @ z} (19)
to be the set of terminal histories reachable from h. In addition, define
Z1[h] = {z ∈ Z | h @ z and(@h′ ∈ H1)h @ h′ @ z} (20)
to be the subset of those histories which include no player 1 actions after the action at h. Define
Succ(h, a) = {h′ ∈ H1 | h @ h′ and(@h′′ ∈ H1)h @ h′′ @ h′} (21)
to be set of histories where player 1 might act next after taking action a at H . Also, for any h ∈ H define
D(h) = {h′ ∈ H1 | h v h′} (22)
to be the set of all histories where player 1 might act after h. Note that if P (h) = 1, then h ∈ D(h).
We extend all of the preceding definitions to information sets in the natural way:
Z[I] =
⋃
h∈I
Z[h]
Z1[I] =
⋃
h∈I
Z1[h]
Succ(I, a) = {I ′ ∈ I1 | (∃h′ ∈ I ′)h′ ∈
⋃
h∈I
Succ(h, a)}
D(I) = {I ′ ∈ I1 | (∃h′ ∈ I ′)h′ ∈
⋃
h∈I
D(h)}
(23)
Consider two information sets I, I ′ ∈ I1 such that I ′ ∈ D(I). By perfect recall, the series of actions that player 1 takes from
I to I ′ must be unique, no matter which h ∈ I is the starting state. Thus we may define piσ1 (I, I ′) = piσ1 (h, h′) for any h ∈ I and
h′ ∈ I ′ where h v h′. Similarly, for z ∈ Z, we can define piσ(I, z) = piσ(h, z) where h is the unique h ∈ I such that h @ z (or
piσ(I, z) = 0 if no such h exists).
For a ∈ A(I), we will use v(I, σ, a) as short for v(I, σ|I→a), where σ|I→a is the strategy profile that always takes action a at
I , but everywhere else is identical to σ.
B Proof of Theorems
For any information set I ∈ I1, action a ∈ A(I), and t ∈ {1, ..., T}, let ct(I, a) be the constraint tilt added to vt(I, a), i.e.
ct(I, a) =
k∑
i=1
λti∇(I,a)fi(Ψ(σt1)) (24)
Given a t ∈ {1, ..., T}, define the tilted counterfactual value v˜t for strategy profile σ, information set I ∈ I1, and action
a ∈ A(I) by the recurrences
v˜t(I, σ, a) =
∑
z∈Z1[Ia]
piσ2−1(z)u(z) +
∑
I′∈Succ(I,a)
v˜t(I ′, σ)− ct(I, a) (25)
v˜t(I, σ) =
∑
a∈A(I)
σ1(I, a)v˜
t(I, σ, a) (26)
Lemma 1. Given a strategy profile σ and a t ∈ {1, ..., T}, if v˜t is defined by recurrences (25) and (26) for every I ∈ I1 and
a ∈ A(I), then for any such I, a the following hold:
v˜t(I, σ, a) = v(I, σ, a)− ct(I, a)−
∑
I′∈D(I)
IavI′
∑
a′∈A(I′)
piσ11 (Ia, I
′a′)ct(I ′, a′) (27)
v˜t(I, σ) = v(I, σ)−
∑
I′∈D(I)
∑
a∈A(I′)
piσ11 (I, I
′a)ct(I ′, a) (28)
Proof. We proceed by strong induction on |D(I)|. In the base case D(I) = {I}, we have that Succ(I, a) is empty for each
a ∈ A(I), that there is no I ′ ∈ D(I) such that Ia v I ′, and that Z[I] = Z1[I]. Thus:
v˜t(I, σ, a) =
∑
z∈Z1[Ia]
piσ2−1(z)u(z) +
∑
I′∈Succ(I,a)
v˜σt (I
′)− ct(I, a)
=
∑
z∈Z[Ia]
piσ2−1(z)u(z)− ct(I, a)
= v(I, σ, a)− ct(I, a)−
∑
I′∈D(I)
IavI′
∑
a′∈A(I′)
piσ11 (Ia, I
′a′)ct(I ′, a′)
and
v˜t(I, σ) =
∑
a∈A(I)
σ1(I, a)v˜
t(I, σ, a)
=
∑
a∈A(I)
σ1(I, a)
 ∑
z∈Z[Ia]
piσ2−1(z)u(z)− ct(I, a)

=
∑
z∈Z[I]
piσ11 (I, z)pi
σ2
−1(z)u(z)−
∑
a∈A(I)
piσ11 (I, Ia)c
t(I, a)
= v(I, σ)−
∑
I′∈D(I)
∑
a∈A(I′)
piσ11 (I, I
′a)ct(I ′, a)
For the inductive step, we consider some I ∈ I1 and assume that the lemma holds for all I ′ such that |D(I ′)| < |D(I)|. In
particular, note that if I ′ ∈ succ(I), then D(I ′) ⊂ D(I), but I ∈ D(I) and by perfect recall I /∈ D(I ′), so we can assume the
lemma holds for all I ′ ∈ succ(I).
v˜t(I, σ, a) =
∑
z∈Z1[Ia]
pi
σ−1
2 (z)u(z) +
∑
I′∈Succ(I,a)
v˜t(I ′, σ)− ct(I, a)
=
∑
z∈Z1[Ia]
piσ11 (Ia, z)pi
σ2
−1(z)u(z)−
∑
I′∈Succ(I,a)
vt(I ′, σ)− ∑
I′′∈D(I′)
∑
a′∈A(I′′)
piσ1 (I
′, I ′′a′)ct(I ′′, a′)
− ct(I, a)
=
∑
z∈Z1[Ia]
piσ11 (Ia, z)pi
σ2
−1(z)u(z) +
∑
I′∈Succ(I,a)
∑
z∈Z[I′]
piσ11 (Ia, z)pi
σ2
−1(z)u(z)
−
∑
I′∈Succ(I,a)
∑
I′′∈D(I′)
∑
a∈A(I′′)
[
piσ11 (Ia, I
′′a)ct(I ′′, a)
]− ct(I, a)
=
∑
z∈Z[Ia]
piσ11 (Ia, z)pi
σ2
−1(z)u(z)−
∑
I′∈D(I)
IavI′
∑
a∈A(I′)
[
piσ11 (Ia, I
′a)ct(I ′, a)
]− ct(I, a)
In the last step, we make use of the fact that
Z[I] = Z1[I] ∪
⋃
I′∈Succ(I)
Z[I ′] and {I ′ ∈ D(I) | Ia v I ′} =
⋃
I′∈Succ(I,a)
D(I ′) (29)
and perfect recall requires that each of these component sets are disjoint.
Substituting v(I, σ, a) for its definition completes the inductive step for v˜t(I, σ, a). Then we also have
v˜t(I, σ) =
∑
a∈A(I)
σ1(I, a)v˜
t(I, σ, a)
=
∑
a∈A(I)
σ1(I, a)
 ∑
z∈Z[Ia]
piσ11 (Ia, z)pi
σ2
−1(z)u(z)−
∑
I′∈D(I)
IavI′
∑
a′∈A(I′)
[
piσ11 (Ia, I
′a′)ct(I ′, a′)
]− ct(I, a)

=
∑
z∈Z[I]
piσ11 (I, z)pi
σ2
−1(z)u(z)−
∑
I′∈D(I)
I′ 6=I
∑
a∈A(I′)
[
piσ11 (I, I
′a)ct(I ′, a)
]− ∑
a∈A(I)
σ1(I, a)c
t(I, a)
= vσ(I)−
∑
I′∈D(I)
∑
a∈A(I′)
piσ11 (I, I
′a)ct(I ′, a)
Next we analyze the tilted regrets that are used in CCFR. Note that v˜t(I, a) and v˜t(I) are defined in the algorithm with
recurrences (25) and (26) where σ = σt. Then we also have
r˜t(I, a) = v˜t(I, σt, a)− v˜t(I, σt) (30)
and for any σ′1 ∈ Σ1 define
r˜t(I, σ′1) =
∑
a∈A(I)
σ′1(I, a)r˜
t(I, a) (31)
Lemma 2. For any I ∈ I1, σ′1 ∈ Σ1, and t ∈ {1, ..., T}∑
I′∈D(I)
pi
σ′1
1 (I, I
′)r˜t(I ′, σ′1) = v˜
t(I, (σ′1, σ
t
2))− v˜t(I, σt) (32)
Proof. First note that
r˜t(I, σ′1) =
∑
a∈A(I)
σ′1(I, a)
[
v˜t(I, σt, a)− v˜t(I, σt)]
=
∑
a∈A(I)
σ′1(I, a)v˜
t(I, σt, a)−
∑
a∈A(I)
σt1(I, a)v˜
t(I, σt, a)
=
∑
a∈A(I)
(
σ′1(I, a)− σt1(I, a)
)
v˜t(I, σt, a)
We now proceed by strong induction on |D(I)|. For the base case, consider I ∈ I1 whereD(I) = {I}. Using that |Succ(I)| = 0:∑
I′∈D(I)
pi
σ′1
1 (I, I
′)r˜t(I ′, σ′1) = r˜
t(I ′, σ′1)
=
∑
a∈A(I)
(σ′1(I, a)− σt1(I, a))v˜t(I ′, σt, a)
=
∑
a∈A(I)
(σ′1(I, a)− σt1(I, a))
 ∑
z∈Z[Ia]
pi
σt2
−1(z)u(z)− ct(I, a)

= vt(I, (σ′1, σ
t
2))−
∑
a∈A(I)
σ′1(I, a)c
t(I, a)−
vt(I, σt)− ∑
a∈A(I)
σt1(I, a)c
t(I, a)

= v˜t(I, (σ′1, σ
t
2))− v˜t(I, σt)
For the inductive step, we consider some I ∈ I1 and assume that the lemma holds for all I ′ such that |D(I ′)| < |D(I)|. In
particular, we assume it holds for each I ′ ∈ Succ(I).∑
I′∈D(I)
pi
σ′1
1 (I, I
′)r˜t(I ′, σ′1) = r˜
t(I, σ′1) +
∑
I′∈Succ(I)
piσ
′
1(I, I ′)
∑
I′′∈D(I′)
pi
σ′1
1 (I
′, I ′′)r˜t(I ′′, σ′1)
= r˜t(I, σ′1) +
∑
I′∈Succ(I)
piσ
′
1(I, I ′)
(
v˜
σ′1,σ
t
2
λt (I
′)− v˜t(I ′)
)
= r˜t(I, σ′1) +
∑
a∈A(I)
σ′1(I, a)
 ∑
I′∈Succ(I,a)
v˜t(I ′, (σ′1, σ
t
2))−
∑
I′∈Succ(I,a)
v˜t(I ′, σt)

= r˜t(I, σ′1) +
∑
a∈A(I)
σ′1(I, a)
v˜t(I, (σ′1, σt2), a)− ∑
z∈Z1[Ia]
pi
σt2
−1(z)u(z) + c
t(I, a)

−
v˜t(I, σt, a)− ∑
z∈Z1[Ia]
pi
σt2
−1(z)u(z) + c
t(I, a)

= r˜t(I, σ′1) + v˜
t(I, (σ′1, σ
t
2))−
∑
a∈A(I)
σ′1(I, a)v˜
t(I, σt, a)
=
∑
a∈A(I)
σ′1(I, a)v˜
t(I, σt, a)− v˜t(I, σt) + v˜t(I, (σ′1, σt2))−
∑
a∈A(I)
σ′1(I, a)v˜
t(I, σt, a)
= v˜t(I, (σ′1, σ
t
2))− v˜t(I, σt)
Lemma 3. For any T ∈ N, for any sequences of strategies σ11 , ..., σT1 and σ12 , ..., σT2 , and any sequence of vectors λ1, ..., λT
each ∈ Rk,
max
σ∗1∈Σ1
T∑
t=1
[
u˜(σ∗1 , σ
t
2, λ
t)− u˜(σt1, σt2, λt)
] ≤ max
σ∗1∈Σ1
∑
I∈I1
pi
σ∗1
1 (I) max
a∈A(I)
T∑
t=1
r˜t(I, a) (33)
Proof. We can modify the original game to add a dummy history ∅ before any other actions where P (∅) = 1, |A(∅)| = 1, and ∅
forms a singleton information set. This doesn’t change the values of the game in any way. Then for any strategy σ1 and any
t ∈ {1, ..., T}, we have that
v˜t(∅, σ) = u(σ1, σt2)−
∑
I∈I1
∑
a∈A(I)
piσ11 (Ia)c
t(I, a) (34)
Then, using the convexity of each fi, we can show for any σ′1 ∈ Σ1 that:
u˜(σ′1, σ
t
2, λ
t)− u˜(σt1, σt2, λt) = u(σ′1, σt2)−
k∑
i=1
λtifi(Ψ(σ
′
1))− u(σt1, σt2) +
k∑
i=1
λtifi(Ψ(σ
t
1))
= u(σ′1, σ
t
2)− u(σt1, σt2) +
k∑
i=1
λti
(
fi(Ψ(σ
t
1))− fi(Ψ(σ′1))
)
≤ u(σ′1, σt2)− u(σt1, σt2) +
k∑
i=1
λti
(〈∇fi(Ψ(σt1)),Ψ(σt1)−Ψ(σ′1)〉)
= u(σ′1, σ
t
2)−
∑
I∈I1
∑
a∈A(I)
pi
σ′1
1 (Ia)c
t(I, a)−
u(σt1, σt2)−∑
I∈I1
∑
a∈A(I)
pi
σt1
1 (Ia)c
t(I, a)

= v˜t(∅, (σ′1, σt2))− v˜t(∅, (σt1, σt2))
We then apply Lemma 2 to give us
T∑
t=1
[
u˜(σ′1, σ
t
2, λ
t)− u˜(σt1, σt2, λt)
]
=
T∑
t=1
[
v˜t(∅, (σ′1, σt2))− v˜t(∅, (σt1, σt2))
]
=
T∑
t=1
∑
I∈I1
pi
σ′1
1 (I)r˜
t(I, σ′1)
=
T∑
t=1
∑
I∈I1
pi
σ′1
1 (I)
∑
a∈A(I)
σ′1(I, a)r˜
t(I, a)
=
∑
I∈I1
pi
σ′1
1 (I)
∑
a∈A(I)
σ′1(I, a)
T∑
t=1
r˜t(I, a)
≤
∑
I∈I1
pi
σ′1
1 (I) max
a∈A(I)
T∑
t=1
r˜t(I, a)
The last statement follows because
∑
a∈A(I) σ
′
1(I, a) = 1.
This holds for all σ′1 ∈ Σ1, so the lemma must hold.
Theorem 4. For any T ∈ N, any sequence of player 2 strategies σ12 , ..., σT2 , and any sequence of vectors λ1, ..., λT each∈ [0, β]k, if CCFR is used to select the sequence of strategies σ11 , ..., σT1 , then
max
σ∗1∈Σ1
1
T
T∑
t=1
[
u˜(σ∗1 , σ
t
2, λ
t)− u˜(σt1, σt2, λt)
] ≤ (∆u + 2kβF )M√|A1|√
T
(35)
where ∆u = maxz u(z)−minz u(z) is the range of possible utilities, k is the number of constraints, F = maxx,i ||∇fi(x)||1
is a bound on the subgradients, and M is a game-specific constant.
Proof. For any information set I ∈ I1, σt1(I, a) is selected for each a ∈ A(I) using regret matching with action values v˜t(I, a).
The bound for regret matching then guarantees
max
a∈A(I)
1
T
T∑
t=1
r˜t(I, a) ≤
√|A(I)|√
T
max
t∈{1,...,T}
a,a′∈A(I)
(v˜t(I, σt, a)− v˜t(I, σt, a′))
Using Lemma 1, we bound the max term as
max
t∈{1,...,T}
a,a′∈A(I)
(v˜t(I, σt, a)− v˜t(I, σt, a′))
= max
t∈{1,...,T}
a,a′∈A(I)
v(I, σt, a)− v(I, σt, a′)− ct(I, a)− ∑
I′∈D(I)
IavI′
∑
a′∈A(I′)
pi
σt1
1 (Ia, I
′a′)ct(I ′, a′)
+ct(I, a′)−
∑
I′∈D(I)
Ia′vI′
∑
a′′∈A(I′)
pi
σt1
1 (Ia
′, I ′a′′)ct(I ′, a′′)

≤ max
σ
a,a′∈A(I)
(v(I, σ, a)− v(I, σ, a′))
+ max
σ
a,a′∈A(I)
|ct(I, a)|+ ∑
I′∈D(I)
IavI′
∑
a′∈A(I′)
|ct(I, a′)|+ |ct(I, a′)|+
∑
I′∈D(I)
Ia′vI′
∑
a′′∈A(I′)
|ct(I, a′′)|

≤ max
z,z′∈Z
(u(z)− u(z′)) + 2
∑
I∈I1
∑
a∈A(I)
|ct(I, a)|
≤ ∆u + 2
k∑
i=1
λti||∇f(Ψ(σt1))||1
≤ ∆u + 2kβF
We can now use this bound with Lemma 3 to give
max
σ∗1∈Σ1
1
T
T∑
t=1
[
u˜(σ∗1 , σ
t
2, λ
t)− u˜(σt1, σt2, λt)
] ≤ √|A(I)|√
T
(∆u + 2kβF ) max
σ∗1∈Σ1
∑
I∈I1
pi
σ∗1
1 (I)
≤ (∆u + 2kβF )M
√|A1|√
T
Define RTλ (β) to the regret of player 2 for choosing the sequence λ
1, ..., λT against the set of possible λ∗ ∈ [0, β]k:
RTλ (β) = max
λ∗∈[0,β]k
T∑
t=1
[−u˜(σt1, σt2, λ∗) + u˜(σt1, σt2, λt)]
RTλ (β) can be minimized by using, e.g., projected gradient descent to choose λ
t for each t.
Define f∗ = minx
∑k
i=1(fi(x))
+ to be the minimum sum of constraint violations (if the constraints are feasible, f∗ = 0), and
define Xf∗ = {x ∈ X |
∑k
i=1(fi(x))
+ = f∗} to be the set of strategies that achieve f∗. Note that these are well-defined and
Xf∗ is non-empty, since each fi is continuous and X is compact. Define Σf
∗
1 = {σ1 ∈ Σ1 | Ψ(σ1) ∈ Xf∗}. Σf
∗
1 is non-empty
as Ψ is surjective.
Theorem 5. For any T ∈ N, any series of vectors λ1, ..., λT each ∈ [0, β]k, and any f1, ..., fk which are convex, continuous
constraints, if CCFR is used to select the sequence of strategies σ11 , ..., σ
T
1 and CFR is used to select the sequence of strategies
σ12 , ..., σ
T
2 , then the following hold:
k∑
i=1
(fi(Ψ(σ
t
1)))
+ − f∗ ≤ R
T
λ (β)
β
+
(∆u + 2kβF )M
√|A1|
β
√
T
+
∆u
β
(36)
max
σ∗1∈Σf
∗
1
u(σ∗1 , σ
T
2 )− min
σ∗2∈Σ2
u(σT1 , σ
∗
2) ≤
4 (∆u + kβF )M
√|A1|√
T
+ 2RTλ (β) (37)
Proof. First, we show (36).
Let σf1 be any strategy in Σ
f∗
1 . Then for any t
u˜(σf1 , σ
t
2, λ
t)− u˜(σt1, σt2, λt) = u(σf1 , σt2)−
k∑
i=1
λtif(Ψ(σ
f
1 ))− u(σt1, σt2) +
k∑
i=1
λtif(Ψ(σ
t
1))
≥
k∑
i=1
λtif(Ψ(σ
t
1))−
k∑
i=1
β(f(Ψ(σf1 )))
+ − (u(σt1, σt2)− u(σf1 , σt2))
≥
k∑
i=1
λtif(Ψ(σ
t
1))− βf∗ −∆u
Applying Theorem 4 then gives us
1
T
T∑
t=1
k∑
i=1
λtif(Ψ(σ
t
1)) ≤
(∆u + 2kβF )M
√|A1|√
T
+ βf∗ + ∆u (38)
Consider now RTλ (β). We have
RTλ (β) = max
λ∗∈[0,β]k
1
T
T∑
t=1
[−u˜(σt1, σt2, λ∗) + u˜(σt1, σt2, λt)]
= max
λ∗∈[0,β]k
1
T
T∑
t=1
k∑
i=1
λ∗i f(Ψ(σ
t
1))−
1
T
T∑
t=1
k∑
i=1
λtif(Ψ(σ
t
1))
≥ max
λ∗∈[0,β]
k∑
i=1
λ∗i f(Ψ(σ
T
1 ))−
1
T
T∑
t=1
k∑
i=1
λtif(Ψ(σ
t
1))
where the last step uses Jensen’s inequality. Combining this with (38) gives us
max
λ∗∈[0,β]
k∑
i=1
λ∗i f(Ψ(σ
T
1 )) ≤ RTλ (β) +
(∆u + 2kβF )M
√|A1|√
T
+ βf∗ + ∆u (39)
Define λσ
T
1 such that, for each index j ∈ {1, ..., k}, we have λσT1j = β if fj(σT1 ) > 0 and λσ
T
1
j = 0 otherwise. Then we have
β
k∑
i=1
(fi(Ψ(σ
T
1 )))
+ =
k∑
i=1
λ
σT1
i fi(Ψ(σ
T
1 ))
≤ max
λ∗∈[0,β]k
k∑
i=1
λ∗i f(Ψ(σ
T
1 ))
≤ (∆u + 2kβF )M
√|A1|√
T
+ βf∗ + ∆u +RTλ (β)
k∑
i=1
(fi(Ψ(σ
T
1 )))
+ − f∗ ≤ R
T
λ (β)
β
+
(∆u + 2kβF )M
√|A1|
β
√
T
+
∆u
β
Next, we show (37). We break this into parts, showing that each player’s average strategy does almost as well as a best response
against the other player’s actual strategy.
Consider first how well player 1 could do be deviating to any other strategy σ′1 ∈ Σf
∗
1 :
u(σ′1, σ
T
2 ) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
u(σ′1, σ
t
2)
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
u˜(σ′1, σ
t
2, λ
t) +
k∑
i=1
λtifi(Ψ(σ
′
1))
≤ 1
T
max
σ∗1∈Σ1
T∑
t=1
u˜(σ′1, σ
t
2, λ
t) + βf∗
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
u˜(σt1, σ
t
2, λ
t) + R˜T1 + βf
∗
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
u(σt1, σ
t
2)−
1
T
T∑
t=1
k∑
i=1
λtifi(Ψ(σ
t
1)) + R˜
T
1 + βf
∗
=
1
T
min
σ∗2
T∑
t=1
u(σt1, σ
∗
2) +R
T
2 +R
T
λ (β)−
1
T
max
λ∗
T∑
t=1
k∑
i=1
λ∗i fi(Ψ(σ
t
1)) + R˜
T
1 + βf
∗
=
1
T
min
σ∗2
T∑
t=1
u(σt1, σ
∗
2)−max
λ∗
k∑
i=1
λ∗i
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
fi(Ψ(σ
t
1))
)
+ R˜T1 +R
T
2 +R
T
λ (β)
≤ u(σT1 , σT2 )−
k∑
i=1
β
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
fi(Ψ(σ
t
1))
)+
+ R˜T1 +R
T
2 +R
T
λ (β) + βf
∗
Using Jensen’s inequality:
≤ u(σT1 , σT2 )− β
k∑
i=1
(
fi(Ψ(σ
T
1 ))
)+
+ R˜T1 +R
T
2 +R
T
λ (β) + βf
∗
≤ u(σT1 , σT2 )− β min
x∈X
k∑
i=1
(fi(x))
+
+ R˜T1 +R
T
2 +R
T
λ (β) + βf
∗
= u(σT1 , σ
T
2 ) + R˜
T
1 +R
T
2 +R
T
λ (β)
This is true for each σ′ ∈ Σf∗1 , so we get
max
σ∗1∈Σf
∗
1
u(σ∗1 , σ
T
2 )− u(σT1 , σT2 ) ≤ R˜T1 +RT2 +RTλ (β) (40)
Next we look at how well player 2 could do by deviating to any other strategy σ′2.
−u(σT1 , σ′2) = −
1
T
T∑
t=1
u(σt1, σ
′
2)
≤ − 1
T
min
σ∗2
T∑
t=1
u(σt1, σ
∗
2)
= − 1
T
T∑
t=1
u(σt1, σ
t
2) +R
T
2
= − 1
T
T∑
t=1
u˜(σt1, σ
t
2, λ
t)− 1
T
T∑
t=1
k∑
i=1
λtifi(Ψ(σ
t
1)) +R
T
2
≤ R˜T1 −
1
T
max
σ∗1
T∑
t=1
u˜(σ∗1 , σ
t
2, λ
t)− 1
T
T∑
t=1
k∑
i=1
λtifi(Ψ(σ
t
1)) +R
T
2
≤ − 1
T
T∑
t=1
u˜(σT1 , σ
t
2, λ
t) +RTλ (β)− max
λ∗∈[0,β]k
1
T
T∑
t=1
k∑
i=1
λ∗i fi(Ψ(σ
t
1)) + R˜
T
1 +R
T
2
= −u(σT1 , σT2 ) +
1
T
T∑
t=1
k∑
i=1
λtifi(Ψ(σ
T
1 ))− max
λ∗∈[0,β]k
1
T
T∑
t=1
k∑
i=1
λ∗i fi(Ψ(σ
t
1)) + R˜
T
1 +R
T
2 +R
T
λ
≤ −u(σT1 , σT2 ) +
1
T
T∑
t=1
k∑
i=1
λtifi(Ψ(σ
T
1 ))−
1
T
T∑
t=1
k∑
i=1
λ
T
i fi(Ψ(σ
t
1)) + R˜
T
1 +R
T
2 +R
T
λ
= −u(σT1 , σT2 ) +
k∑
i=1
λ
T
i
(
fi(Ψ(σ
T
1 ))−
1
T
T∑
t=1
fi(Ψ(σ
t
1))
)
+ R˜T1 +R
T
2 +R
T
λ
≤ −u(σT1 , σT2 ) + R˜T1 +RT2 +RTλ
In the last step we use Jensen’s inequality, along with the fact that λ
T
i ≥ 0 for all i.
Again, this holds for all σ′2, so necessarily
− min
σ∗2∈Σ2
u(σT1 , σ
∗
2) + u(σ
T
1 , σ
T
2 ) ≤ R˜T1 +RT2 +RTλ (β) (41)
Adding together (40) and (41), then substituting bounds on R˜T1 (from Theorem 40) and R
T
2 (from CFR bound) gives the result.
Theorem 1 follows from the second part of Theorem 5 when the constraints are simultaneously feasible, in which case σf
∗
1
becomes the feasible set. Theorem 2 follows from the first part of Theorem 5 when the constraints are simultaneously feasible,
noting that fi(Ψ(σt1)) ≤
∑k
i=1(fi(Ψ(σ
t
1)))
+ for all i.
We now prove Theorem 3, which we restate here for clarity.
Theorem 3. Assume that f1, ..., fk satisfy a constraint qualification such as Slater’s condition, and define λ∗ to be a finite
solution for λ in the Lagrangian optimization. Then if β is chosen such that β > λ∗i for all i, and CCFR and CFR are used to
respectively select the strategy sequences σ11 , ..., σ
T
1 and σ
1
2 , ..., σ
T
2 , the following holds:
fi(Ψ(σ
T
1 )) ≤
RTλ (β)
β − λ∗i
+
2 (∆u + kβF )M
√|A|
(β − λ∗i )
√
T
∀i ∈ {1, ..., k} (42)
Proof. We establish the theorem by proving upper and lower bounds on the gap in exploitability between σT1 and the optimal
strategy in the modified game with utility function u˜ and λ ∈ [0, β], and comparing the bounds.
First, we show that the exploitability gap for any strategy can be lower bounded in terms of the strategy’s constraint violations.
Because we assume a constraint qualification, there is a finite λ∗ that is a solution the optimization
λ∗ ∈ argmin
λ≥0
max
σ1∈Σ1
min
σ2∈Σ2
u˜(σ1, σ2,λ). (43)
Note that by assuming a constraint qualification, strong duality holds and we can rearrange the order of min and max terms in the
optimization without changing the solution. Consider an arbitrary σ′1 ∈ Σ1:
min
λ∈[0,β]k
min
σ2∈Σ2
u(σ′1, σ2)−
k∑
i=1
λifi(Ψ(σ
′
1)) = min
σ2∈Σ2
u(σ′1, σ2)−
k∑
i=1
β(fi(Ψ(σ
′
1)))
+
= min
σ2∈Σ2
u(σ′1, σ2)−
k∑
i=1
λ∗i (fi(Ψ(σ
′
1)))
+ −
k∑
i=1
(β − λ∗i )(fi(Ψ(σ′1)))+
≤ max
σ1∈Σ1
min
σ2∈Σ2
[
u(σ1, σ2)−
k∑
i=1
λ∗i fi(Ψ(σ1))
]
−
k∑
i=1
(β − λ∗i )(fi(Ψ(σ′1)))+
= min
λ≥0
max
σ1∈Σ1
min
σ2∈Σ2
[
u(σ1, σ2)−
k∑
i=1
λifi(Ψ(σ1))
]
−
k∑
i=1
(β − λ∗i )(fi(Ψ(σ′1)))+
≤ min
λ∈[0,β]k
max
σ1∈Σ1
min
σ2∈Σ2
[
u(σ1, σ2)−
k∑
i=1
λifi(Ψ(σ1))
]
−
k∑
i=1
(β − λ∗i )(fi(Ψ(σ′1)))+
= max
σ1∈Σ1
min
λ∈[0,β]k
min
σ2∈Σ2
[
u(σ1, σ2)−
k∑
i=1
λifi(Ψ(σ1))
]
−
k∑
i=1
(β − λ∗i )(fi(Ψ(σ′1)))+
In the last line we use strong duality, which follows from the assumed constraint qualification. This holds for any σ′1, and thus we
have established that
max
σ1∈Σ1
min
λ∈[0,β]k
min
σ2∈Σ2
u˜(σ1, σ2,λ)− min
λ∈[0,β]k
min
σ2∈Σ2
u˜(σT1 , σ2,λ) ≥
k∑
i=1
(β − λ∗i )(fi(Ψ(σT1 )))+ (44)
We now show an upper bound on exploitability based on the regrets of the sequences used in CCFR:
min
λ∈[0,β]k
min
σ2∈Σ2
[
u(σT1 , σ2)−
k∑
i=1
λifi(Ψ(σ
T
1 ))
]
≥ min
λ∈[0,β]k
min
σ2∈Σ2
k∑
t=1
[
u(σt1, σ2)−
k∑
i=1
λifi(Ψ(σ
t
1))
]
by Jensen’s inequality
≥
T∑
t=1
[
u(σt1, σ
t
2)−
k∑
i=1
λtifi(Ψ(σ
t
1))
]
−RT2 −RTλ (β)
≥ max
σ1∈Σ1
T∑
t=1
[
u(σ1, σ
t
2)−
k∑
i=1
λtifi(Ψ(σ1))
]
− R˜T1 −RT2 −RTλ (β)
≥ max
σ1∈Σ1
min
λ∈[0,β]k
min
σ2∈Σ2
[
u(σ1, σ2)−
k∑
i=1
λifi(Ψ(σ1))
]
− R˜T1 −RT2 −RTλ (β)
This gives us an upper bound of:
max
σ1∈Σ1
min
λ∈[0,β]k
min
σ2∈Σ2
u˜(σ1, σ2,λ)− min
λ∈[0,β]k
min
σ2∈Σ2
u˜(σT1 , σ2,λ) ≤ R˜T1 +RT2 +RTλ (β) (45)
Comparing to (45), this gives us that, for any j ∈ {1, ..., k}
k∑
i=1
(β − λ∗i )(fi(Ψ(σT1 )))+ ≤ R˜T1 +RT2 +RTλ (β) (46)
(β − λ∗j )(fj(Ψ(σT1 )))+ ≤ R˜T1 +RT2 +RTλ (β) (47)
fj(Ψ(σ
T
1 )) ≤
R˜T1 +R
T
2 +R
T
λ (β)
β − λ∗j
(48)
In the last line we use the assumption that β > λ∗j . Substituting in the CCFR and CFR bounds for R˜
T
1 and R
T
2 completes the
proof.
C Infeasible constraints
By Theorem 5, CCFR still converges when the constraints are infeasible. Effectively, the constrained strategy set is relaxed
so that the constrained player instead chooses from the set of strategies that minimize the total (L1 norm) infeasibility of the
constraints. Thus, (36) says that the constrained player’s strategy isn’t much more infeasible than the least infeasible strategy,
and (37) says that the strategies are near-optimal given this restriction.
The relaxation of the constrained set follows from the bounding of the Lagrange multipliers. In fact, with bounded multipliers,
the Lagrangian optimization becomes equivalent to a regularized optimization.
Lemma 4. For any optimization function g : X → R, constraint set f1, ..., fk, and bound β > 0 the following holds:
min
x∈X
max
0≤λ≤β
g(x) +
k∑
i=1
λifi(x) = min
x∈X
g(x) + β
k∑
i=1
(fi(x))
+. (49)
Proof. As β > 0, it follows that 0 ≤ λ ≤ β is feasible and thus
min
x∈X
max
0≤λ≤β
g(x) +
k∑
i=1
λifi(x) = min
x∈X
ξ≥0
max
0≤λ
g(x) +
k∑
i=1
λifi(x) +
k∑
i=1
(β − λi)ξi
= min
x∈X
ξ≥0
max
0≤λ
g(x) +
k∑
i=1
λi(fi(x)− ξi) + β
k∑
i=1
ξi
For each i, necessarily fi(x) ≤ ξi, or unbounded λi could be chosen. Given this constraint, λi = 0.
= min
x∈X
ξi≥(fi(x))+
g(x) + β
k∑
i=1
ξi
= min
x∈X
g(x) + β
k∑
i=1
(fi(x))
+
The fact the strategy set is relaxed to strategies that minimize infeasibility as measured by the L1 norm in particuar is a
consequence of bounding the L∞ norm of the Lagrange multipliers. If we cared more about maximum violation of any particular
constraint, we could bound the L1 norm of the multipliers instead.
D Constraints for opponent modeling
In poker and similar games, the actions which constitute a history h can be uniquely decomposed into two sets of private chance
actions ci[h] and c−i[h] which are only visible to ourselves or our opponents, respectively, and public actions s[h] which both
players observe. In poker, the private chance actions are the private cards, consituting a hand, dealt to each player—we will use
this terminology. Let Ci and C−i be the sets of possible hands (so Ci = {ci[h] | h ∈ H}), and let S = {s[h] | h ∈ H} be the
set of possible public action sequences. For any ci ∈ Ci, c−i ∈ C−i, s ∈ S, let h(ci, c−i, s) be the corresponding history if it
exists and define pi(ci, c−i, s) = pi(h(ci, c−i, s)). If the history doesn’t exist, we let pic(ci, c−i, s) = 0 to simplify the analysis.
For brevity, when h(ci, c−i, s) ∈ Z, we define u(ci, c−i, s) = u(h(ci, c−i, s)).
We assume that, for a given h, whether h ∈ Z is uniquely determined by s[h]. We thus define SZ = {s ∈ S | h(·, ·, s) ∈ Z} to
be the set of public action sequences that lead to terminal histories. In the games we are interested in, there are terminal histories
where the public actions fully determine the players’ utilities, such that u(ci, c−i, s) = u(c′i, c
′
−i, s) for all ci, c
′
i, c−i, c
′
−i (in
poker, this occurs when a player folds, in which case the cards dealt do not matter). We define SuZ ⊆ SZ to be the set of public
action sequences that lead to such terminal histories, and define u(s[z]) = u(z) for z ∈ SuZ .
We introduce a method for opponent modeling from partially observed games. In this setting, the game is played until a
terminal history z is reached, then ci[z] and c−i[z] are publicly revealed only if they affect the game outcome (i.e. s[z] /∈ SuZ).
Thus, while we always observe ci[z] and s[z], we only sometimes observe c−i[z]. We wish to use these observed games to model
the opponent, but without observing c−i[z] we do not have direct samples of their strategy. If we only use data from the games
where we do observe c−i[z], then our samples are biased. Instead of directly building a model of the opponent strategy, we
construct a set of constraints which the strategy must satisfy in order to be consistent with the observed data.
Our first set of constraints tells us how often our opponent plays to reach any part of the game, summed across all of his hands.
In particular, this tells us how often he folds given the opportunity to do so. We construct these constraints estimating how often
we hold a hand ci ∈ Ci and the opponent plays to reach a public node s ∈ §. Because we always observe ci[h] and s[h], we have
unbiased samples of Prσ[ci, s] =
∑
c−i pi
σ(ci, c−i, s) for each ci ∈ Ci and s ∈ S.4 We apply the Wilson score interval (Wilson
4We assume that our own strategy σi plays to reach each history with nonzero probability.
1927) to calculate bounds Lci,s and Uci,s such that Lci,s ≤ Prσ[ci, s] ≤ Uci,s with probability at least γ, where γ is a chosen
confidence level. Noting that
Prσ[ci, s] =
∑
c−i∈C−i
pic(ci, c−i, s)piσii (ci, c−i, s)pi
σ−i
−i (ci, c−i, s)
and that pic and piσii are known, these bounds thus constitute linear sequence-form constraints. We also note that our own reach
probability piσii (ci, c−i, s) cannot depend on c−i, as we don’t observe it, and thus define pi
σi
i (ci, s) = pi
σi
i (ci, c−i, s). We can also
replace this quantity with an observed estimate pˆiσii (ci, s), which is unbiased and better correlated with the observed probability
Pˆrσ[s]. This gives us sequence-form constraints
Lci,s ≤ pˆiσii (ci, s)
∑
c−i∈C−i
pic(ci, c−i, s)pi
σf
−i(c−i, s) ≤ Uci,s ∀ci ∈ Ci,∀s ∈ S (50)
where σf ∈ Σ−i is the constrained strategy.
Our second set of constraints tells us how often the opponent plays to reach a showdown, i.e. a terminal history z such that
s[z] ∈ SZ \ SuZ . We always observe the full history when s[z] ∈ SZ \ SuZ occurs, and thus have unbiased samples of piσ(z).
Again, we calculate Wilson score intervals Lz ≤ piσ(z) ≤ Uz with confidence γ, which become the sequence-form constraints
Lz ≤ pˆiσii (z)pic(z)piσf−i(z) ≤ Uz ∀z ∈ Z s.t. s[z] ∈ SZ \ SuZ (51)
Together, constraints (50) and (51) are sufficient to ensure that we maximally exploit the modeled opponent in the limit. To
show this, we begin by characterizing when two strategies are equivalent in terms of expected utility.
Lemma 5. Let σ−i, σ′−i ∈ Σ−i be two strategies such that∑
c−i∈C−i
pic(ci, c−i, s)pi
σ−i
−i (c−i, s) = pic(ci, c−i, s)pi
σ′−i
−i (c−i, s) ∀ci ∈ Ci,∀s ∈ SuZ (52)
pi
σ−i
−i (c−i, s) = pi
σ′−i
−i (c−i, s) ∀c−i ∈ C−i,∀s ∈ SZ \ SuZ . (53)
Then for any σi ∈ Σi, it is the case that
u(σi, σ−i) = u(σi, σ′−i). (54)
Proof.
u(σi, σ−i) =
∑
z∈Z
pic(z)pi
σi
i (z)pi
σ−i
−i (z)u(z) (55)
=
∑
s∈SuZ
∑
ci∈Ci
∑
c−i∈C−i
pic(ci, c−i, s)piσii (ci, s)pi
σ−i
−i (c−i, s)u(ci, c−i, s) (56)
+
∑
s∈SZ\SuZ
∑
ci∈Ci
∑
c−i∈C−i
pic(ci, c−i, s)piσii (ci, s)pi
σ−i
−i (c−i, s)u(ci, c−i, s) (57)
=
∑
s∈SuZ
u(s)
∑
ci∈Ci
piσii (ci, s)
∑
c−i∈C−i
pic(ci, c−i, s)pi
σ−i
−i (c−i, s) (58)
+
∑
s∈SZ\SuZ
∑
ci∈Ci
∑
c−i∈C−i
pic(ci, c−i, s)piσii (ci, s)pi
σ−i
−i (c−i, s)u(ci, c−i, s) (59)
=
∑
s∈SuZ
u(s)
∑
ci∈Ci
piσii (ci, s)
∑
c−i∈C−i
pic(ci, c−i, s)pi
σ′−i
−i (c−i, s) (60)
+
∑
s∈SZ\SuZ
∑
ci∈Ci
∑
c−i∈C−i
pic(ci, c−i, s)piσii (ci, s)pi
σ′−i
−i (c−i, s)u(ci, c−i, s) (61)
= u(σi, σ
′
−i)
Theorem 6. Given partial observations from n games of an opponent using strategy σ−i, let σi be a strategy computed by
running CCFR with constraints (50) and (51) for T iterations. Then as n and T approach infinity, σi converges to a best response
to σ−i.
Proof. As n goes to infinity, each pˆiσii (h) converges to pi
σi
i (h), and each confidence interval bound L or U converges to the true
expectation of the estimated statistic. Thus, our constraints converge to equality constraints and any feasible strategy σf ∈ Σ−i
must satisfy ∑
c−i∈C−i
pic(ci, c−i, s)pi
σ−i
−i (c−i, s) = pic(ci, c−i, s)pi
σf
−i(c−i, s) ∀ci ∈ Ci,∀s ∈ SuZ
pi
σ−i
−i (c−i, s) = pi
σf
−i(c−i, s) ∀c−i ∈ C−i,∀s ∈ SZ \ SuZ .
By Lemma 37 we have that u(σi, σf ) = u(σi, σ−i) for any σi ∈ Σi. By Theorem 1, the average strategy σTi converges to a best
response to σT−i, and σ
T
−i converges to the feasible set. Thus
u(σTi , σ−i) = u(σ
T
i , σ
T
−i) ≥ u(σ′i, σT−i) = u(σ′i, σ−i) (62)
and σTi is a best response to σ−i.
